Quasi-Judicial

Characteristics of Administration of Justice

The judicial power is clearly involved in determining the guilt or innocence of persons charged with offences. In civil cases, it is exercised in determining in a final manner by definite adjudication according to the law, rights and obligations in dispute between the citizen and citizens or a citizen and the State, (or other parties, whoever they be) and in binding the parties to such determination. The essential element is that it should have power by its determination within jurisdiction to impose rights, impose liabilities and affect rights.

McDonald v Bord na gCon, identified the following as having characteristics of the administration of justice;

• a dispute or controversy as to the exercise of legal rights or a violation of the law;
• determination or ascertainment of the rights of the parties or imposition of liabilities or the infliction of a penalty;
• final determination (albeit subject to appeal) of legal rights or liabilities or the imposition of penalties;
• enforcement of those rights or liabilities or the imposition of a penalty by the executive power of the State;
• the making of an order by the court which as a matter of history is an order characteristic of courts of the country.

It has been held that

• the issue by a Peace Commissioner of warrants,
• DPP changing or substituting counts,
• raising of tax assessments by Inspector of Taxes,
• appointment of investigators,
• commutation and the remission of sentence,

were not the exercise of judicial power.

Determination of Criminality

The application of the separation of powers is more pronounced where a matter is criminal and determines criminal liability, which is reserved exclusively to the courts. The fact that a decision may have serious consequences does not make it a criminal sanction.

The fact that a censor of publications may ban a publication did not involve the indication of criminal liability even though books were confiscated. No body or person suffers punishment, normally the consequence of criminal conviction.

The former power of Peace Commissioners to remand persons in custody and grant or refuse bail was held to be unconstitutional.

The right of pardon and power to commute or remit punishment imposed by any court, exercising criminal jurisdiction is vested in the President and exercisable on the advice of the Minister for Justice.

Limited Functions of Judicial Nature

The Constitution specifically provides in Article 37, nothing in this Constitution shall operate to invalidate the exercise of limited functions and powers of judicial nature in matters other than criminal matters by any person or body of person duly authorised by law to exercise such function and powers, notwithstanding that such body, person or such body of persons is not a judge or a court-appointed or established as such under the Constitution.

It is not a question of limited jurisdiction, whether the limitation be in regard to persons or subject matter. It is the powers or functions which must be limited, not the ambit of their exercise. Nor is the test of limitation to be sought in the number of powers and functions which are exercised.

The exercise of functions by the Land Commission (historically vested in the judicial commissioners who were judges) was claimed to be an unconstitutional exercise of the judicial power. In Fisher v Land Commission, 1948, it was held that the powers were not judicial in nature but involved matters of policy rather than legal rights.

The powers of the Censorship Board were held to be a limited permissible quasi-judicial function within the meaning of Article 37.

Courts   & Tribunals

A tribunal is not a court in the strict sense, just because it gives a final decision because it hears witnesses on oath nor because two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide because it gives decisions that affect the rights of subjects nor because there is an appeal to the court.

The fact that the powers entrusted to a tribunal must be exercised judicially does not in itself make their exercise an exercise of the judicial power. Nor does the fact that a tribunal may incidentally have to determine legal questions involve the conclusion that it is exercising judicial power. Nor is it material that the tribunal surrounds itself with the trappings of courts or follows the usual procedure of a trial.

The Tribunal of Inquiry Act, inquiries do not constitute the administration of justice, notwithstanding that they impact on a person’s good name and have much of the trappings of a court. They have been held to be of an inquisitorial nature and not a controversy regarding the violation of law.

The determining of truth or falsity is not necessarily a judicial act, in the sense that it may only be performed by a judge. A variety of tribunals and other bodies routinely decide disputes of facts.

There have been many instances where purported adjudications by executive bodies have been found to be unconstitutional. Re Solicitors Act; the varieties and combinations of powers, with which the legislature may equip a tribunal are wide.

In each case, the particular powers must be considered in their totality and separately to see if the tribunal is invested with powers of such nature and extent that their exercise is in effect administering justice which appertains to the judicial power and which the Constitution provides is to be properly entrusted only to judges.

Professional Discipline

Tribunals having but a few powers and functions but those of far-reaching effect and importance could not properly be regarded as exercising limited powers and functions. The test as to whether power is or is not limited lies in the effect of the assigned power when exercised. If the exercise of the assigned power and function is calculated ordinarily to affect in the most profound and far-reaching way, the life, liberties, fortunes, or reputation of those against whom it has been exercised, they cannot properly be described as limited.

In Re Solicitors Act, the Supreme Court held that the disciplinary functions and in particular, striking off were not the exercise of a limited function or power of judicial nature. This function has been traditionally exercised by judges. The solicitor could be ordered by the committee to make compensation or restitution to clients.

In M v The Medical Council, it was held that the Medical Practitioners Act 1978 was constitutional because the relevant fitness of the practice committee was authorised to make findings as to misconduct followed by application to the High Court for the imposition of a sanction of more serious sanctions.

Provisions in Bord na gCon’s rules which provides power discipline was held not to be either judicial or even judicial in the limited sense of Article 37. Similarly, adjudication by the Institute of Chartered Accountants on disciplinary matters was held to be contractual in nature, and it did not involve the administration of justice.