{"id":23064,"date":"2023-08-24T22:25:10","date_gmt":"2023-08-24T22:25:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/?p=23064"},"modified":"2023-08-27T16:00:38","modified_gmt":"2023-08-27T16:00:38","slug":"criminal-decision","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/criminal-decision\/","title":{"rendered":"Criminal Decision [ECHR]"},"content":{"rendered":"<div id=\"ez-toc-container\" class=\"ez-toc-v2_0_63 counter-hierarchy ez-toc-counter ez-toc-grey ez-toc-container-direction\">\n<div class=\"ez-toc-title-container\">\n<p class=\"ez-toc-title \" >Table of Contents<\/p>\n<span class=\"ez-toc-title-toggle\"><a href=\"#\" class=\"ez-toc-pull-right ez-toc-btn ez-toc-btn-xs ez-toc-btn-default ez-toc-toggle\" aria-label=\"Toggle Table of Content\"><span class=\"ez-toc-js-icon-con\"><span class=\"\"><span class=\"eztoc-hide\" style=\"display:none;\">Toggle<\/span><span class=\"ez-toc-icon-toggle-span\"><svg style=\"fill: #999;color:#999\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" class=\"list-377408\" width=\"20px\" height=\"20px\" viewBox=\"0 0 24 24\" fill=\"none\"><path d=\"M6 6H4v2h2V6zm14 0H8v2h12V6zM4 11h2v2H4v-2zm16 0H8v2h12v-2zM4 16h2v2H4v-2zm16 0H8v2h12v-2z\" fill=\"currentColor\"><\/path><\/svg><svg style=\"fill: #999;color:#999\" class=\"arrow-unsorted-368013\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" width=\"10px\" height=\"10px\" viewBox=\"0 0 24 24\" version=\"1.2\" baseProfile=\"tiny\"><path d=\"M18.2 9.3l-6.2-6.3-6.2 6.3c-.2.2-.3.4-.3.7s.1.5.3.7c.2.2.4.3.7.3h11c.3 0 .5-.1.7-.3.2-.2.3-.5.3-.7s-.1-.5-.3-.7zM5.8 14.7l6.2 6.3 6.2-6.3c.2-.2.3-.5.3-.7s-.1-.5-.3-.7c-.2-.2-.4-.3-.7-.3h-11c-.3 0-.5.1-.7.3-.2.2-.3.5-.3.7s.1.5.3.7z\"\/><\/svg><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span><\/div>\n<nav><ul class='ez-toc-list ez-toc-list-level-1 ' ><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-1\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/criminal-decision\/#Art_2_Prot_7_Right_of_appeal_in_criminal_matters\" title=\"Art 2 Prot 7\u00a0 Right of appeal in criminal matters\">Art 2 Prot 7\u00a0 Right of appeal in criminal matters<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-2\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/criminal-decision\/#Art_Prot_7_Compensation_for_wrongful_conviction\" title=\"Art Prot 7 Compensation for wrongful conviction\">Art Prot 7 Compensation for wrongful conviction<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-3\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/criminal-decision\/#Art_4_Prot_7_%E2%80%93_Right_not_to_be_tried_or_punished_twice\" title=\"Art 4 Prot 7 \u2013 Right not to be tried or punished twice\">Art 4 Prot 7 \u2013 Right not to be tried or punished twice<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-4\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/criminal-decision\/#Tribunal_established_by_law_I\" title=\"Tribunal established by law I\">Tribunal established by law I<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-5\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/criminal-decision\/#Tribunal_established_by_law_II\" title=\"Tribunal established by law II\">Tribunal established by law II<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-6\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/criminal-decision\/#Independence\" title=\"Independence\">Independence<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-7\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/criminal-decision\/#No_intervention_by_parties_to_the_dispute\" title=\"No intervention by parties to the dispute\">No intervention by parties to the dispute<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-8\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/criminal-decision\/#Military_criminal_courts\" title=\"Military criminal courts\">Military criminal courts<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-9\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/criminal-decision\/#Security_of_judicial_tenure\" title=\"Security of judicial tenure\">Security of judicial tenure<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-10\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/criminal-decision\/#Civil_or_criminal_liability_of_judges\" title=\"Civil or criminal liability of judges\">Civil or criminal liability of judges<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-11\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/criminal-decision\/#Impression_of_independence\" title=\"Impression of independence\">Impression of independence<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-12\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/criminal-decision\/#Concurrent_judicial_functions_in_the_same_case\" title=\"Concurrent judicial functions in the same case\">Concurrent judicial functions in the same case<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-13\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/criminal-decision\/#Judicial_or_administrative_role_of_public_prosecutors\" title=\"Judicial or administrative role of public prosecutors\">Judicial or administrative role of public prosecutors<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/nav><\/div>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Art_2_Prot_7_Right_of_appeal_in_criminal_matters\"><\/span>Art 2 Prot 7\u00a0 Right of appeal in criminal matters<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>1 Everyone convicted of a criminal offence by a tribunal shall have the right to have his conviction or sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal. The exercise of this right, including the grounds on which it may be exercised, shall be governed by law.<\/p>\n<p>2 This right may be subject to exceptions in regard to offences of a minor character, as prescribed by law, or in cases in which the person concerned was tried in the first instance by the highest tribunal or was convicted following an appeal against acquittal. Galstyan v Armenia confirms that a clear definable appeal procedure consistently available is required. The procedure for review offered was not sufficient.<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Art_Prot_7_Compensation_for_wrongful_conviction\"><\/span>Art Prot 7 Compensation for wrongful conviction<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed, or he has been pardoned, on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated according to the law or the practice of the State concerned, unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him.<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Art_4_Prot_7_%E2%80%93_Right_not_to_be_tried_or_punished_twice\"><\/span>Art 4 Prot 7 \u2013 Right not to be tried or punished twice<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>1 No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State.<\/p>\n<p>2 The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent the reopening of the case in accordance with the law and penal procedure of the State concerned, if there is evidence of new or newly discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the case. 34 3 No derogation from this Article shall be made under Article 15 of the Convention.<\/p>\n<p>Sergey Zolotukhin v Russia\u00a0A confirms that the article prohibits prosecution and trial for a second offence arising from identical facts are facts that are substantially the same and the guarantee comes into play when a new set of proceedings instituted after a prior acquittal or conviction has acquired the status of res judicata.<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Tribunal_established_by_law_I\"><\/span>Tribunal established by law I<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>Gu\u00f0mundur Andri \u00c1str\u00e1\u00f0sson v. Iceland concerned the applicant\u2019s allegation that the new Icelandic Court of Appeal (Landsr\u00e9ttur) which had upheld his conviction for road traffic offences was not a tribunal \u201cestablished by law\u201d, on account of irregularities in the appointment of one of the judges who heard his case.<\/p>\n<p>The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, finding that the applicant had been denied his right to a tribunal established by law on account of the participation in his trial of a judge whose appointment had been undermined by grave irregularities which had impaired the very essence of that right.<\/p>\n<p>In particular, given the potential implications of finding a violation and the important interests at stake, the Court took the view that the right to a tribunal established by law should not be construed too broadly such that any irregularity in a judicial appointment procedure would risk compromising that right. It thus formulated a three-step test to determine whether irregularities in a judicial appointment procedure were of such gravity as to entail a violation of the right to a tribunal established by law.<\/p>\n<p>Controls on ministerial power had been further intensified in connection with the appointment of judges to the newly established Court of Appeal, where Parliament had been tasked with approving every candidate proposed by the Minister of Justice, in order to enhance the legitimacy of this new court. However, as found by the Icelandic Supreme Court, this legal framework had been breached, particularly by the Minister of Justice, when four of the new Court of Appeal judges had been appointed. While the Minister had been authorised by law to depart from the Evaluation Committee\u2019s proposal, subject to certain conditions, she had disregarded a fundamental procedural rule that obliged her to base her decision on sufficient investigation and assessment<\/p>\n<p>Xero Flor w Polsce sp. z o.o. v. Poland This case concerned proceedings brought by the applicant company claiming compensation for damage to its property, and its complaint about the appointment of one judge in particular to the Constitutional Court which had examined its case. The applicant company complained in particular of the domestic courts\u2019 refusal to refer legal questions to the Constitutional Court. It also alleged that the bench of five judges of the Constitutional Court which had examined its case had been composed in violation of the Constitution. In particular, one judge had been elected by the Sejm (the lower house of the Parliament), despite that post having already been filled by another judge elected by the preceding Sejm.<\/p>\n<p>The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention as regards the right to a fair hearing and a violation Article 6 \u00a7 1 as regards the right to a tribunal established by law. It found in particular that \u2013 despite the applicant company\u2019s repeated raising of the matter \u2013 the domestic courts had not answered its arguments that the law applied in its case had been incompatible with the Constitution and, consequently, had failed in their duty under the Convention to provide reasoned decisions. The Court furthermore adjudged that the actions of the authorities in appointing one of the judges who had been on the bench in the applicant company\u2019s case and the ignoring of the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgments in that connection had meant that the panel that had tried the case had not been a tribunal established by law.<\/p>\n<p>Reczkowicz v. Poland The applicant, a barrister who had been suspended for three years following several incidents when she was representing a client, submitted that the Disciplinary Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court, which had decided on a case concerning her, had not been a \u201ctribunal established by law\u201d and had lacked impartiality and independence.<\/p>\n<p>The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, finding that the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court, which had examined the applicant\u2019s case, was not a \u201ctribunal established by law\u201d. It noted, in particular, that the procedure for appointing judges to the Disciplinary Chamber had been unduly influenced by the legislative and executive powers. That amounted to a fundamental irregularity that adversely affected the whole process and compromised the legitimacy of the Disciplinary Chamber.<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Tribunal_established_by_law_II\"><\/span>Tribunal established by law II<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>Juszczyszyn v. Poland, judgment of 6 October 2022 Advance Pharma Sp. z o.o. v. Poland This case concerned a complaint brought by the applicant company that the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court, which had decided on a case concerning it, had not been a \u201ctribunal established by law\u201d and had lacked impartiality and independence.<\/p>\n<p>The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, finding that The Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court was not an \u201cindependent and impartial tribunal established by law\u201d within the meaning of the Convention. It noted, in particular, that the procedure for appointing judges to the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court had been unduly influenced by the legislative and executive powers.<\/p>\n<p>Grz\u0119da v. Poland\u00a0concerned the removal of the applicant, a judge, from the National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ) before his term had ended and his inability to get judicial review of that decision. His removal had taken place in the context of judicial reforms in Poland. The applicant complained in particular of having been denied access to a court.<\/p>\n<p>The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, finding that the lack of judicial review in the case had impaired the applicant\u2019s right of access to a court. The Court emphasised, in particular, that it was fully aware of the context of the case \u2013 the weakening of judicial independence and adherence to rule-of- law standards brought about by Government reforms. In particular, successive judicial reforms had been aimed at weakening judicial independence, starting with the grave irregularities in the election of judges of the Constitutional Court in December 2015, then, in particular, the remodelling of the NCJ and the setting up of new chambers of the Supreme Court, while extending the Minister of Justice\u2019s control over the courts and increasing his role in matters of judicial discipline.<\/p>\n<p>The Court also referred to itsjudgments related to the reorganisation of the Polish judicial system, as well as the cases decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union and the relevant rulings of the Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative Court of Poland. It held that as a result of these successive reforms, the judiciary had been exposed to interference by the executive and legislature and its independence had been substantially weakened. The applicant\u2019s case was one example of this general trend.<\/p>\n<p>\u017burek v. Poland The applicant in this case, a judge, was also spokesperson for the National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ), the constitutional body in Poland which safeguards the independence of courts and judges. In that capacity, he had been one of the main critics of the changes to the judiciary initiated by the legislative and executive branches of the new Government which came to power in 2015. The case concerned his removal from the NCJ.The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 and a violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the Convention in the present case. Following the same reasoning as in the case Grz\u0119da v. Poland (see above), it found that the lack of judicial review of the decision to remove the applicant from the NCJ had breached his right of access to a court. The Court also found that the accumulation of measures taken against the applicant \u2013 including his dismissal as spokesperson of a regional court, the audit of his financial declarations and the inspection of his judicial work \u2013 had been aimed at intimidating him because of the views that he had expressed in defence of the rule of law and judicial independence. In finding these violations, the Court emphasised the overall context of successive judicial reforms, which had resulted in the weakening of judicial independence and what has widely been described as the rule-of-law crisis in Poland.<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Independence\"><\/span>Independence<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>Toni Kostadinov v. Bulgaria 27 January 2015 concerned the pre-trial detention of the applicant, a former officer of the national police, who had been arrested on suspicion of being part of a criminal gang, and respect for his right to be presumed innocent. The applicant alleged in particular that remarks made by the Minister of the Interior at a press conference, unequivocally identifying him as one of the most influential members of a gang of burglars, had breached his right to be presumed innocent.<\/p>\n<p>The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 2 (presumption of innocence) of the Convention, finding that the remarks by the Minister of the Interior had breached the applicant\u2019s right to be presumed innocent.<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"No_intervention_by_parties_to_the_dispute\"><\/span>No intervention by parties to the dispute<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>Beg S.p.a. v. Italy 2021 concerned the arbitration of a dispute involving a hydroelectric-power agreement for power generation in Albania involving the applicant company and ENELPOWER, a company which had been spun off from ENEL, the former State power company. It related to, in particular, the impartiality of the arbitration panel, as one of its members (N.I.) had been on the board of ENEL and had worked as that company\u2019s lawyer.<\/p>\n<p>The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention on account of the lack of impartiality of the arbitration panel in the present case. It noted in particular that N.I. had been acting as ENEL\u2019s lawyer when appointed arbitrator, and that that company had owned 100% of ENELPOWER and had had close ties at that time. In the light also of N.I.\u2019s having previously been vice-chairman and on the board of ENEL, the Court considered that the applicant company\u2019s fears concerning the impartiality of N.I. had been objectively justified.<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Military_criminal_courts\"><\/span>Military criminal courts<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>\u0130brahim G\u00fcrkan v. Turkey 2012 The applicant was convicted by a military criminal court, during his military service, for wilfully disobeying a superior. He alleged that his case had not been heard by an independent tribunal because the court was made up of a military officer with no legal background and two military judges.<\/p>\n<p>The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, finding that the military criminal court that had convicted the applicant could not be considered to have been independent and impartial. Noting in particular that participation of lay judges as such was not contrary to Article 6 of the Convention, the Court did not consider that the military officer\u2019s lack of legal qualifications had hindered his independence or impartiality. However, he was a serving officer who remained in the service of the army and was subject to military discipline. He had also been appointed to the bench by his hierarchical superiors and did not enjoy the same constitutional safeguards as the other two military judges.<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Security_of_judicial_tenure\"><\/span>Security of judicial tenure<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>Baka v. Hungary case concerned the premature termination of the mandate of the applicant, President of the Hungarian Supreme Court, following his criticism of legislative reforms and the fact that he was unable to challenge that decision before a court.<br \/>\n6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, finding that Hungary had impaired the very essence of the applicant\u2019s right of access to a court. It noted in particular that the premature termination of the applicant\u2019s term of office had not been reviewed by an ordinary tribunal or by another body exercising judicial powers, nor was it open to review.<\/p>\n<p>The Court considered that this lack of judicial review had resulted from legislation whose compatibility with the requirements of the rule of law was doubtful.<\/p>\n<p>Broda and Bojara v. Poland concerned the applicants\u2019 complaint that they did not have any remedy allowing them to challenge the decisions of the Minister of Justice to put a premature end to their term of office as vice-presidents of the Kielce Regional Court. The applicants alleged in particular that their removal had been unlawful and arbitrary and that there had been no specific judicial remedy enabling them to challenge the decision.<\/p>\n<p>The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention in the present case. As the premature termination of the applicants\u2019 term of office as court vice-presidents had not been examined either by an ordinary court or by another body exercising judicial duties, the Court found that the respondent State had infringed the very essence of the applicants\u2019 right of access to a court.<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Civil_or_criminal_liability_of_judges\"><\/span>Civil or criminal liability of judges<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>Sergey Zubarev v. Russia concerned the national courts\u2019 refusal to accept a defamation claim brought by the applicant, a lawyer, against a judge on grounds of judicial immunity. The courts subsequently refused to accept the applicant\u2019s claim for consideration because of the judge\u2019s judicial immunity from liability in her professional capacity as presiding judge of the civil case.<\/p>\n<p>The Court held that there had been no violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, finding that, in the exercise of their responsibility to regulate the conduct of the civil proceedings, the national authorities had not exceeded their margin of appreciation in limiting the applicant\u2019s access to a court, and that a reasonable relationship of proportionality could be said to have existed between the judicial immunity in the course of the administration of justice and the legitimate aim pursued in the public interest. The Court noted in particular that judicial immunity was a legal practice that existed in some form in many States Parties to the Convention.<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Impression_of_independence\"><\/span>Impression of independence<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>Findlay v. The United Kingdom The applicant, who served in the army, complained that the martial court, that had sentenced him to two years\u2019 imprisonment, demoted him to the rank of guardsman and dismissed him from the army, had not been an independent and impartial tribunal, because, inter alia, all the officers appointed to it were directly subordinate to the convening officer who also performed the role of prosecuting authority.<\/p>\n<p>The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, finding that, on account in particular of the central role played by the convening officer in the organisation of the court martial, the applicant\u2019s misgivings about the independence and impartiality of the tribunal which had dealt with his case had been objectively justified.<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Concurrent_judicial_functions_in_the_same_case\"><\/span>Concurrent judicial functions in the same case<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>Wettstein v. Switzerland 2000 The applicant complained of the lack of impartiality of two judges (lawyers acting as part-time judges) in administrative proceedings to which he was a party. The judges had acted either directly as lawyers, or through their office partner, against the applicant in separate proceedings.<br \/>\nThe Court held that there had been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention as regards the requirement of an impartial tribunal. It noted in particular that, while there was no material link between the applicant\u2019s case and the separate proceedings in which the two lawyers had acted as legal representatives, there was in fact an overlap in time, since the latter proceedings were still pending before the Federal Court when the former were instituted and indeed only ended two months before the Administrative Court\u2019s judgment..<\/p>\n<p>Fazli Aslaner v. Turkey 2014 \u00a0concerned administrative proceedings in which judges at the Turkish Supreme Administrative Court had been involved on more than one occasion, in the context of successive appeals on points of law.<\/p>\n<p>The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, finding that the applicant\u2019s concerns regarding the impartiality of the General Assembly as it was composed in the instant case could be regarded as objectively justified. It noted in particular that the fact that certain judges had previously formed an opinion did not in itself suffice to conclude that the impartiality of the general assembly of administrative divisions had been affected.<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Judicial_or_administrative_role_of_public_prosecutors\"><\/span>Judicial or administrative role of public prosecutors<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>Moulin v. France The applicant, a lawyer, was arrested and placed in police custody on suspicion of breaching the secrecy of judicial investigations concerning a case of drug trafficking.<\/p>\n<p>The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 (right to be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by the law to exercise judicial power) of the Convention in respect of the applicant. It noted in particular that deputy prosecutors, who were not irremovable, were members of the minist\u00e8re public (prosecuting authorities) under the authority of the Minister of Justice, a member of government, and therefore that of the executive. The hierarchical relationship between the Minister of Justice and the prosecuting authorities was at the time a subject of debate in France and it was not for the Court to take a stance in a debate which was a matter for the domestic authorities.<\/p>\n<!--themify_builder_content-->\n<div id=\"themify_builder_content-23064\" data-postid=\"23064\" class=\"themify_builder_content themify_builder_content-23064 themify_builder tf_clear\">\n    <\/div>\n<!--\/themify_builder_content-->\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Art 2 Prot 7\u00a0 Right of appeal in criminal matters 1 Everyone convicted of a criminal offence by a tribunal shall have the right to have his conviction or sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal. The exercise of this right, including the grounds on which it may be exercised, shall be governed by law. 2 [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_exactmetrics_skip_tracking":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_active":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_note":"","_exactmetrics_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[345],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23064"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=23064"}],"version-history":[{"count":19,"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23064\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":23534,"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23064\/revisions\/23534"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=23064"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=23064"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=23064"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}