{"id":23127,"date":"2023-08-25T18:52:34","date_gmt":"2023-08-25T18:52:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/?p=23127"},"modified":"2023-08-27T16:00:38","modified_gmt":"2023-08-27T16:00:38","slug":"decision-delay","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/decision-delay\/","title":{"rendered":"Proceedings Delay [ECHR]"},"content":{"rendered":"<div id=\"ez-toc-container\" class=\"ez-toc-v2_0_63 counter-hierarchy ez-toc-counter ez-toc-grey ez-toc-container-direction\">\n<div class=\"ez-toc-title-container\">\n<p class=\"ez-toc-title \" >Table of Contents<\/p>\n<span class=\"ez-toc-title-toggle\"><a href=\"#\" class=\"ez-toc-pull-right ez-toc-btn ez-toc-btn-xs ez-toc-btn-default ez-toc-toggle\" aria-label=\"Toggle Table of Content\"><span class=\"ez-toc-js-icon-con\"><span class=\"\"><span class=\"eztoc-hide\" style=\"display:none;\">Toggle<\/span><span class=\"ez-toc-icon-toggle-span\"><svg style=\"fill: #999;color:#999\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" class=\"list-377408\" width=\"20px\" height=\"20px\" viewBox=\"0 0 24 24\" fill=\"none\"><path d=\"M6 6H4v2h2V6zm14 0H8v2h12V6zM4 11h2v2H4v-2zm16 0H8v2h12v-2zM4 16h2v2H4v-2zm16 0H8v2h12v-2z\" fill=\"currentColor\"><\/path><\/svg><svg style=\"fill: #999;color:#999\" class=\"arrow-unsorted-368013\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" width=\"10px\" height=\"10px\" viewBox=\"0 0 24 24\" version=\"1.2\" baseProfile=\"tiny\"><path d=\"M18.2 9.3l-6.2-6.3-6.2 6.3c-.2.2-.3.4-.3.7s.1.5.3.7c.2.2.4.3.7.3h11c.3 0 .5-.1.7-.3.2-.2.3-.5.3-.7s-.1-.5-.3-.7zM5.8 14.7l6.2 6.3 6.2-6.3c.2-.2.3-.5.3-.7s-.1-.5-.3-.7c-.2-.2-.4-.3-.7-.3h-11c-.3 0-.5.1-.7.3-.2.2-.3.5-.3.7s.1.5.3.7z\"\/><\/svg><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span><\/div>\n<nav><ul class='ez-toc-list ez-toc-list-level-1 ' ><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-1\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/decision-delay\/#Length_of_Proceedings\" title=\"Length of Proceedings\">Length of Proceedings<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-2\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/decision-delay\/#Determination_of_the_length_of_the_proceedings\" title=\"Determination of the length of the proceedings\">Determination of the length of the proceedings<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-3\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/decision-delay\/#Reasonable_Time_Principles\" title=\"Reasonable Time Principles\">Reasonable Time Principles<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-4\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/decision-delay\/#Reasonable_time_Criteria\" title=\"Reasonable time\u00a0 Criteria\">Reasonable time\u00a0 Criteria<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-5\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/decision-delay\/#Complexity_of_the_case\" title=\"Complexity of the case\">Complexity of the case<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-6\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/decision-delay\/#The_applicants_conduct\" title=\"The applicant\u2019s conduct\">The applicant\u2019s conduct<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-7\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/decision-delay\/#Conduct_of_the_competent_authorities\" title=\"Conduct of the competent authorities\">Conduct of the competent authorities<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-8\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/decision-delay\/#What_is_at_stake_in_the_dispute\" title=\"What is at stake in the dispute\">What is at stake in the dispute<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-9\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/decision-delay\/#Others\" title=\"Others\">Others<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/nav><\/div>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Length_of_Proceedings\"><\/span>Length of Proceedings<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention<br \/>\n\u201c1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations &#8230;, everyone is entitled to a &#8230; hearing within a reasonable time by [a] tribunal &#8230;\u201d<\/p>\n<p>In requiring cases to be heard within a \u201creasonable time\u201d, the Convention underlines the importance of administering justice without delays which might jeopardise its effectiveness and\u00a0credibility (H. v. France, 1989, \u00a7 58; Katte Klitsche de la Grange v. Italy, 1994, \u00a7 61). Article 6 \u00a7 1 obliges the Contracting States to organise their legal systems so as to enable the courts to comply with its various requirements.<\/p>\n<p>The Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of administering justice without delays which might jeopardise its effectiveness and credibility (Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], 2006, \u00a7 224). Where the Court finds that in a particular State there is a practice incompatible with the Convention resulting from an accumulation of breaches of the \u201creasonable time\u201d requirement, this constitutes an \u201caggravating circumstance of the violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1\u201d (Bottazzi v. Italy [GC], 1999, \u00a7 22; Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], 2006,\u00a7 225). For the length of execution proceedings, see section on \u201cExecution of judgments\u201d.<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Determination_of_the_length_of_the_proceedings\"><\/span>Determination of the length of the proceedings<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>As regards the starting-point of the relevant period, time normally begins to run from the moment the action was instituted before the competent court (Poiss v. Austria, 1987, \u00a7 50; Bock v. Germany, 1989, \u00a7 35), unless an application to an administrative authority is a prerequisite for bringing court proceedings, in which case the period may include the mandatory preliminary administrative procedure (Kress v. France [GC], 2001, \u00a7 90; K\u00f6nig v. Germany, 1978, \u00a7 98; X v. France, 1992, \u00a7 31; Schouten and Meldrum v. the Netherlands, 1994, \u00a7 62).<\/p>\n<p>Thus, in some circumstances, the reasonable time may begin to run even before the issue of the writ commencing proceedings before the court to which the claimant submits the dispute (Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], 2007, \u00a7 65; Golder v. the United Kingdom, 1975, \u00a7 32 in fine; Erkner and Hofauer v. Austria, 1987, \u00a7 64). However, this is exceptional and has been accepted where, for example, certain preliminary steps were a necessary preamble to the proceedings (Blake v. the United Kingdom, 2006, \u00a7 40). For the case of a civil-party claim, see Nicolae Virgiliu T\u0103nase v. Romania [GC], 2019, \u00a7\u00a7 207-208; Arnoldi v. Italy, 2017, \u00a7\u00a7 25-40; and Koziy v. Ukraine, 2009, \u00a7 25).<\/p>\n<p>Article 6 \u00a7 1 may also apply to proceedings which, although not wholly judicial in nature, are nonetheless closely linked to supervision by a judicial body. This was the case, for example, with a procedure for the partition of an estate which was conducted on a non-contentious basis before two notaries, but was ordered and approved by a court (Siegel v. France, 2000, \u00a7\u00a7 33-38). The duration of the procedure before the notaries was therefore taken into account in calculating the reasonable time.<\/p>\n<p>As to when the period ends, it normally covers the whole of the proceedings in question, including appeal proceedings (K\u00f6nig v. Germany, 1978, \u00a7 98 in fine), and thus both interim and final decisions (Mierl\u0103 and Others v. Romania (dec.), 2022, \u00a7 78). It extends right up to the decision which disposes of the dispute (Poiss v. Austria, 1987, \u00a7 50). Hence, the reasonable-time requirement applies to all stages of the legal proceedings aimed at settling the dispute, not excluding stages subsequent to the judgment on the merits (Robins v. the United Kingdom, 1997, \u00a7\u00a7 28-29), meaning that the final determination of costs and expenses may be covered within the period under examination (\u010ci\u010dmanec v. Slovakia, 2016, \u00a7 50).<\/p>\n<p>The execution of a judgment, given by any court, is therefore to be considered as an integral part of the proceedings for the purposes of calculating the relevant period (Martins Moreira v. Portugal, 1988, \u00a7 44; Silva Pontes v. Portugal, 1994, \u00a7 33; Di Pede v. Italy, 1996, \u00a7 24). Time does not stop running until the right asserted in the proceedings actually becomes effective (Estima Jorge v. Portugal, 1998, \u00a7\u00a7 36-38).<\/p>\n<p>Where the pronouncement of a decision at a public hearing and the drafting of the full text of the decision take place at separate times, the proceedings are not deemed to have been completed until the final reasoned decision is deposited at the registry of the the court that gave it, or until the parties concerned are notified of the decision, including where a lengthy period elapses between the\u00a0pronouncement of the decision and its notification to the parties (Mierl\u0103 and Others v. Romania (dec.), 2022, \u00a7\u00a7 78 and 82).<\/p>\n<p>Proceedings before a Constitutional Court are taken into consideration where, although the court has no jurisdiction to rule on the merits, its decision is capable of affecting the outcome of the dispute before the ordinary courts (Deumeland v. Germany, 1986, \u00a7 77; Pammel v. Germany, 1997,<br \/>\n\u00a7\u00a7 51-57; S\u00fc\u00dfmann v. Germany, 1996, \u00a7 39). Nevertheless, the obligation to hear cases within a reasonable time cannot be construed in the same way as for an ordinary court (ibid., \u00a7 56; Or\u0161u\u0161 and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010, \u00a7 109). 39<\/p>\n<p>Lastly, as regards the intervention of third parties in civil proceedings, the following distinction should be made: where the applicant has intervened in domestic proceedings only on his or her own behalf the period to be taken into consideration begins to run from that date, whereas if the applicant has declared his or her intention to continue the proceedings as heir he or she can complain of the entire length of the proceedings (Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], 2016, \u00a7 220).<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Reasonable_Time_Principles\"><\/span>Reasonable Time Principles<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>Obligation on member States: they are required to organise their judicial systems in such a way that their courts are able to guarantee everyone\u2019s right to a final decision on disputes concerning civil rights and obligations within a reasonable time (Comingersoll S.A. v. Portugal [GC], 2000, \u00a7 24; Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], 2016, \u00a7 142).<\/p>\n<p>Assessment in the specific case: The reasonableness of the length of proceedings coming within the scope of Article 6 \u00a7 1 must be assessed in each case according to the particular circumstances (Frydlender v. France [GC], 2000, \u00a7 43), which may call for a global assessment (; Comingersoll S.A. v. Portugal [GC], 2000, \u00a7 23; Nicolae Virgiliu T\u0103nase v. Romania [GC], 2019, \u00a7 214; Obermeier v. Austria, 1990, \u00a7 72).<\/p>\n<p>The whole of the proceedings must be taken into account (K\u00f6nig v. Germany, 1978, \u00a7 98 in fine).<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>While different delays may not in themselves give rise to any issue, they may, when viewed together and cumulatively, result in a reasonable time being exceeded (Deumeland v. Germany, 1986, \u00a7 90). Thus, although the length of each stage of the proceedings (approximately one and a half years) might not be considered unreasonable as such, the overall duration may nonetheless be excessive (Satakunnan Markkinap\u00f6rssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, \u00a7\u00a7 210-11).<\/li>\n<li>A delay during a particular phase of the proceedings may be permissible provided that the total duration of the proceedings is not excessive (Pretto and Others v. Italy, 1983, \u00a7 37).<\/li>\n<li>The national authorities may have remained active throughout the proceedings, with delays being caused by procedural defects (Nicolae Virgiliu T\u0103nase v. Romania [GC], 2019, \u00a7 213).<\/li>\n<li>\u201cLong periods during which the proceedings &#8230; stagnate\u201d without any explanations being<br \/>\nforthcoming are not acceptable (Beaumartin v. France, 1994, \u00a7 33).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The assessment of whether the time taken was reasonable may also have regard to the special characteristics of the proceedings in question (see Omdahl v. Norway, 2021, \u00a7\u00a7 47 and 54-55, concerning the division of a deceased person\u2019s estate between the heirs, which took more than twenty-two years).<\/p>\n<p>The restrictions necessitated by a pandemic, such as the COVID-19 health crisis, may have an adverse effect on the processing of cases by the domestic courts (Q and R v. Slovenia, 2022, \u00a7 80), although this cannot in principle release the State from all responsibility for the excessive length of the proceedings in question.<\/p>\n<p>The applicability of Article 6 \u00a7 1 to preliminary proceedings or interim measures, including injunctions, will depend on whether certain conditions are fulfilled (Micallef v. Malta [GC], 2009, \u00a7\u00a7 83-86).40<\/p>\n<p>Proceedings for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) are not taken into consideration in the assessment of the length of time attributable to the domestic authorities (Satakunnan Markkinap\u00f6rssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, \u00a7 208; Pafitis and Others v. Greece, 1998, \u00a7 9541).<\/p>\n<p>If the State has introduced a compensatory remedy for breaches of the reasonable-time principle and the remedy, examined as a whole, has not caused the applicant to lose \u201cvictim\u201d status for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention, this constitutes an \u201caggravating circumstance\u201d in the context of a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 for exceeding a reasonable time (Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], 2006,<br \/>\n\u00a7 225).<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Reasonable_time_Criteria\"><\/span>Reasonable time\u00a0 Criteria<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>The reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and in accordance with the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (Comingersoll S.A. v. Portugal [GC], 2000; Frydlender v. France [GC], 2000, \u00a7 43; S\u00fcrmeli v. Germany [GC], 2006, \u00a7 128; Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], 2016, \u00a7 143; Nicolae Virgiliu T\u0103nase v. Romania [GC], 2019, \u00a7 209). The Bieli\u0144ski v. Poland judgment, 2022, summarised the applicable case-law principles (\u00a7\u00a7 42-44).<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Complexity_of_the_case\"><\/span>Complexity of the case<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>The complexity of a case may relate both to the facts and to the law (Papachelas v. Greece [GC], 1999, \u00a7 39; Katte Klitsche de la Grange v. Italy, 1994, \u00a7 55). It may relate, for instance, to the involvement of several parties in the case (H. v. the United Kingdom, 1987, \u00a7 72) or to the various items of evidence that have to be obtained (Humen v. Poland [GC], 1999, \u00a7 63). A case may be legally complex because of the scarcity of precedents at national level, or the need to seek a ruling from the CJEU on questions relating to the interpretation of European law (Satakunnan Markkinap\u00f6rssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, \u00a7 212).<\/p>\n<p>In Nicolae Virgiliu T\u0103nase v. Romania [GC], 2019, proceedings involving a civil-party claim were of \u201cconsiderable factual complexity\u201d, which had increased because of the many expert reports required (\u00a7 210) \u2013 with regard to expert reports, compare with Q and R v. Slovenia, \u00a7 79, 2022.<\/p>\n<p>The complexity of the domestic proceedings may explain their length (Tierce v. San Marino, 2003, \u00a7 31). However, while acknowledging the complexity of insolvency proceedings, the Court has found that a duration of approximately twenty-five years and six months did not satisfy the \u201creasonable time\u201d requirement (Cipolletta v. Italy, 2018, \u00a7 44).<\/p>\n<p>Even if the case in itself is not a particularly complex one, the lack of clarity and foreseeability in the domestic law may also render its examination difficult and contribute decisively to extending the length of the proceedings (Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], 2016, \u00a7 150).<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"The_applicants_conduct\"><\/span>The applicant\u2019s conduct<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>Article 6 \u00a7 1 does not require applicants actively to cooperate with the judicial authorities, nor can they be blamed for making full use of the remedies available to them under domestic law (Erkner and Hofauer v. Austria, 1987, \u00a7 68) or for consequences linked to their medical condition (Nicolae Virgiliu T\u0103nase v. Romania [GC], 2019, \u00a7 211). Nevertheless, the national authorities cannot be held accountable for any resulting increase in the length of the proceedings (ibid.).<\/p>\n<p>The person concerned is required only to show diligence in carrying out the procedural steps relating to him, to refrain from using delaying tactics and to avail himself of the scope afforded by domestic law for shortening the proceedings (Uni\u00f3n Alimentaria Sanders S.A. v. Spain, 1989, \u00a7 35). The Court will consider the impact of such requests on the length of proceedings (Q and R v. Slovenia, 2002, \u00a7 78).<\/p>\n<p>Applicants\u2019 behaviour constitutes an objective fact which cannot be attributed to the respondent State and which must be taken into account for the purpose of determining whether or not the reasonable time referred to in Article 6 \u00a7 1 has been exceeded (Poiss v. Austria, \u00a7 57; Wiesinger v. Austria, 1991, \u00a7 57; Humen v. Poland [GC], 1999, \u00a7 66). An applicant\u2019s conduct cannot by itself be used to justify periods of inactivity.<\/p>\n<p>Some examples concerning the applicant\u2019s conduct:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>a lack of alacrity by the parties in filing their submissions may contribute decisively to the slowing-down of the proceedings (Vernillo v. France, 1991, \u00a7 34);<\/li>\n<li>frequent\/repeated changes of counsel (K\u00f6nig v. Germany, 1978, \u00a7 103);<\/li>\n<li>requests or omissions which have an impact on the conduct of the proceedings (Acquaviva v. France, 1995, \u00a7 61), or lack of diligence in carrying out procedural steps (Keaney v. Ireland, 2020, \u00a7 95); see also S\u00fcrmeli v. Germany [GC], 2006, \u00a7 131;<\/li>\n<li>an attempt to secure a friendly settlement (Pizzetti v. Italy, 1993, \u00a7 18; Laino v. Italy [GC], 1999, \u00a7 22);<\/li>\n<li>proceedings brought erroneously before a court lacking jurisdiction (Beaumartin v. France, 1994, \u00a7 33);<\/li>\n<li>litigious behaviour as evidenced by numerous applications and other claims (Pereira da Silva v. Portugal, 2016, \u00a7\u00a7 76-79).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Although the domestic authorities cannot be held responsible for the conduct of a defendant, the delaying tactics used by one of the parties do not absolve the authorities from their duty to ensure that the proceedings are conducted within a reasonable time (Mincheva v. Bulgaria, 2010, \u00a7 68).<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Conduct_of_the_competent_authorities\"><\/span>Conduct of the competent authorities<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>The State is responsible for all its authorities: not just the judicial organs, but all public institutions (Martins Moreira v. Portugal, 1988, \u00a7 60); for the extent of the State\u2019s responsibility, see Bieli\u0144ski v. Poland, 2022, \u00a7 44, concerning backlogs of cases, delays in producing reports, including expert opinions, structural deficiencies and measures to be taken\/resources to be allocated within the judicial system. Only delays attributable to the State may justify a finding of failure to comply with the \u201creasonable time\u201d requirement (Humen v. Poland [GC], 1999, \u00a7 66; Buchholz v. Germany, 1981, \u00a7 49; Papageorgiou v. Greece, 1997, \u00a7 40). The Court examines the proceedings as a whole, meaning that although the national authorities may be deemed responsible for certain procedural defects which caused delays in the proceedings, they may still have complied with their duty to examine the case expeditiously under Article 6 (Nicolae Virgiliu T\u0103nase v. Romania [GC], 2019, \u00a7 211).<\/p>\n<p>Even in legal systems applying the principle that the procedural initiative lies with the parties, the latter\u2019s attitude does not absolve the courts from the obligation to ensure the expeditious trial required by Article 6 \u00a7 1 (S\u00fcrmeli v. Germany [GC], 2006, \u00a7 129; Pafitis and Others v. Greece, 1998,\u00a7 93; Tierce v. San Marino, 2003, \u00a7 31).<\/p>\n<p>The same applies where the cooperation of an expert is necessary during the proceedings: responsibility for the preparation of the case and the speedy conduct of the trial lies with the judge (S\u00fcrmeli v. Germany [GC], 2006, \u00a7 129; Capuano v. Italy, 1987, \u00a7\u00a7 30-31; Versini v. France, 2001, \u00a7 29).<\/p>\n<p>Although the obligation to give a decision within a \u201creasonable time\u201d also applies to a Constitutional Court, it cannot be construed in the same way as for an ordinary court. Its role as guardian of the Constitution makes it particularly necessary for a Constitutional Court sometimes to take into account other considerations than the mere chronological order in which cases are entered on the list, such as the nature of a case and its importance in political and social terms (compare Or\u0161u\u0161 and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010, \u00a7 109; S\u00fc\u00dfmann v. Germany, 1996, \u00a7\u00a7 56-58; Voggenreiter v. Germany, 2004, \u00a7\u00a7 51-52). Furthermore, while Article 6 requires that judicial proceedings be expeditious, it also lays emphasis on the more general principle of the proper administration of justice (Von Maltzan and Others v. Germany (dec.) [GC], 2005, \u00a7 132). Nevertheless, a chronic overload cannot justify excessive length of proceedings (Probstmeier v. Germany, 1997, \u00a7 64). For an example of unreasonably lengthy proceedings before a constitutional court, see Project-Trade d.o.o. v. Croatia, 2020, \u00a7\u00a7 101-102, and for the suspension of the examination of a case by the ordinary courts pending the adoption of a position by the Constitutional Court, see Bieli\u0144ski v. Poland, 2022, \u00a7 47.<\/p>\n<p>Since it is for the member States to organise their legal systems in such a way as to guarantee the right to obtain a judicial decision within a reasonable time, an excessive workload cannot be taken into consideration (Vocaturo v. Italy, 1991, \u00a7 17; Cappello v. Italy, 1992, \u00a7 17; regarding an exceptionally heavy workload, see, for example, Bieli\u0144ski v. Poland, 2022, \u00a7 46). Nonetheless, a temporary backlog of business does not involve liability on the part of the State provided the latter has taken reasonably prompt remedial action to deal with an exceptional situation of this kind (Buchholz v. Germany, 1981, \u00a7 51). Methods which may be considered, as a provisional expedient, include choosing to deal with cases in a particular order, based not just on the date when they were brought but on their degree of urgency and importance and, in particular, on what is at stake for the persons concerned. However, if a state of affairs of this kind is prolonged and becomes a matter of structural organisation, such methods are no longer sufficient and the State must ensure the adoption of effective measures (Zimmermann and Steiner v. Switzerland, 1983, \u00a7 29; Guincho v. Portugal, 1984, \u00a7 40). The fact that such backlog situations have become commonplace does not justify the excessive length of proceedings (Uni\u00f3n Alimentaria Sanders S.A. v. Spain, 1989, \u00a7 40).<\/p>\n<p>Furthermore, the introduction of a reform designed to speed up the examination of cases cannot justify delays since States are under a duty to organise the entry into force and implementation of such measures in a way that avoids prolonging the examination of pending cases (Fisanotti v. Italy, 1998, \u00a7 22). In that connection, the adequacy or otherwise of the domestic remedies introduced by a member State in order to prevent or provide redress for the problem of excessively long proceedings must be assessed in the light of the principles established by the Court (Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], 2006, \u00a7\u00a7 178 et seq. and 223). A far-reaching reform of the national justice system affecting a particular court\u2019s operational capacity does not exempt the State from its Convention obligation to act diligently (Bara and Kola v. Albania, 2021, \u00a7\u00a7 68-71).<\/p>\n<p>The State was also held to be responsible for the failure to comply with the reasonable-time requirement in a case where there was an excessive amount of judicial activity focusing on the applicant\u2019s mental state. The domestic courts continued to have doubts in that regard despite the existence of five reports attesting the applicant\u2019s soundness of mind and the dismissal of two guardianship applications; moreover, the litigation lasted for over nine years (Bock v. Germany, 1989,<br \/>\n\u00a7 47).<\/p>\n<p>A strike by members of the Bar cannot by itself render a Contracting State liable with respect to the \u201creasonable time\u201d requirement; however, the efforts made by the State to reduce any resultant delay are to be taken into account for the purposes of determining whether the requirement has been complied with (Papageorgiou v. Greece, 1997, \u00a7 47).<\/p>\n<p>Where repeated changes of judge slow down the proceedings because each of the judges has to begin by acquainting himself with the case, this cannot absolve the State from its obligations regarding the reasonable-time requirement, since it is the State\u2019s task to ensure that the administration of justice is properly organised (Lechner and Hess v. Austria, 1987, \u00a7 58).<\/p>\n<p>While it is not the Court\u2019s function to analyse the manner in which the national courts interpreted and applied the domestic law, it nonetheless considers that judgments quashing previous findings and remitting the case are usually due to errors committed by the lower courts and that the repetition of such judgments may point to a shortcoming in the justice system (Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], 2016, \u00a7 147).<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"What_is_at_stake_in_the_dispute\"><\/span>What is at stake in the dispute<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>Examples of categories of cases which by their nature call for particular expedition:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Particular diligence is required in cases concerning civil status and capacity (Bock v. Germany, 1989, \u00a7 49; Laino v. Italy [GC], 1999, \u00a7 18; Mikuli\u0107 v. Croatia, 2002, \u00a7 44).<\/li>\n<li>Child custody cases must be dealt with speedily (Hokkanen v. Finland, 1994, \u00a7 72; Niederb\u00f6ster v. Germany, 2003, \u00a7 39), all the more so where the passage of time may have irreversible consequences for the parent-child relationship (Tsikakis v. Germany, 2011, \u00a7\u00a7 64 and 68) \u2013 likewise, cases concerning parental responsibility and contact rights call for particular expedition (Laino v. Italy [GC], 1999, \u00a7 22; Paulsen-Medalen and Svensson v. Sweden, 1998, \u00a7 39). The requirement of special diligence applies to foster care proceedings instituted by grandparents whose grandchildren had been left without parental care (Q and R v. Slovenia, 2022, \u00a7 80).<\/li>\n<li>Employment disputes by their nature call for expeditious decision (Frydlender v. France [GC], 2000, \u00a7 45; Vocaturo v. Italy, 1991, \u00a7 17; and Ruotolo v. Italy, 1992, \u00a7 17; see also the references in Bara and Kola v. Albania, 2021, \u00a7 72) \u2013 whether the issue at stake is access to a liberal profession (Thlimmenos v. Greece [GC], 2000, \u00a7\u00a7 60 and 62), the applicant\u2019s whole professional livelihood (K\u00f6nig v. Germany, 1978, \u00a7 111), the continuation of the applicant\u2019s occupation (Garcia v. France, 2000, \u00a7 14), an appeal against dismissal (Frydlender v. France [GC], 2000, \u00a7 45; Buchholz v. Germany, 1981, \u00a7 52), the applicant\u2019s suspension (Obermeier v. Austria, 1990, \u00a7 72), transfer (Sartory v. France, 2009, \u00a7 34) or reinstatement (Ruotolo v. Italy, 1992, \u00a7 117), or where an amount claimed is of vital significance to the applicant (Doustaly v. France, 1998, \u00a7 48). This category includes pensions disputes (Borgese v. Italy, 1992, \u00a7 1818; see also Bieli\u0144ski v. Poland, 2022, \u00a7 48).). For a dispute about a promotion, see Bara and Kola v. Albania, 2021, \u00a7 72.<\/li>\n<li>Exceptional diligence is required from the authorities in the case of an applicant who suffers from an \u201cincurable disease\u201d and has \u201creduced life expectancy\u201d (X v. France, 1992, \u00a7 47; A. and Others v. Denmark, 1996, \u00a7\u00a7 78-81; Pailot v. France, 1998, \u00a7 68).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Others\"><\/span>Others<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Special diligence was required of the relevant judicial authorities in investigating a complaint lodged by an individual alleging that he had been subjected to violence by police officers (Caloc v. France, 2000, \u00a7 120).<\/li>\n<li>In a case where the applicant\u2019s disability pension made up the bulk of his resources, the proceedings by which he sought to have that pension increased in view of the deterioration of his health were of particular significance for him, justifying special diligence on the part of the domestic authorities (Moci\u00e9 v. France, 2003, \u00a7 22); see also in this context, the case of a reduction in means of subsistence, Bieli\u0144ski v. Poland, 2022, \u00a7 48.<\/li>\n<li>In a case concerning an action for damages brought by an applicant who had suffered physical harm and was aged 65 when she applied to join the proceedings as a civil party, the issue at stake called for particular diligence from the domestic authorities (Codarcea v. Romania, 2009, \u00a7 89).<\/li>\n<li>The issue at stake for the applicant may also be the right to education (Or\u0161u\u0161 and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010, \u00a7 109).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>On the contrary, special diligence is not required, for example, for a claim for compensation relating to damage sustained in a road accident (Nicolae Virgiliu T\u0103nase v. Romania [GC], 2019, \u00a7 213) or the division of a deceased person\u2019s estate between the heirs, as specified in Omdahl v. Norway, 2021, \u00a7\u00a7 63-64.<\/p>\n<p>For a case concerning a delay in the drafting of the reasons for a court judgment, see Mierl\u0103 and Others v. Romania (dec.), 2022, \u00a7 80.<\/p>\n<!--themify_builder_content-->\n<div id=\"themify_builder_content-23127\" data-postid=\"23127\" class=\"themify_builder_content themify_builder_content-23127 themify_builder tf_clear\">\n    <\/div>\n<!--\/themify_builder_content-->\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Length of Proceedings Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention \u201c1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations &#8230;, everyone is entitled to a &#8230; hearing within a reasonable time by [a] tribunal &#8230;\u201d In requiring cases to be heard within a \u201creasonable time\u201d, the Convention underlines the importance of administering justice without [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_exactmetrics_skip_tracking":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_active":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_note":"","_exactmetrics_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[345],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23127"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=23127"}],"version-history":[{"count":12,"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23127\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":23532,"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23127\/revisions\/23532"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=23127"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=23127"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=23127"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}