{"id":23380,"date":"2023-08-26T19:21:02","date_gmt":"2023-08-26T19:21:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/?p=23380"},"modified":"2023-08-27T15:53:51","modified_gmt":"2023-08-27T15:53:51","slug":"proving-discrimination","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/proving-discrimination\/","title":{"rendered":"Proving Discrimination [ECHR]"},"content":{"rendered":"<div id=\"ez-toc-container\" class=\"ez-toc-v2_0_63 counter-hierarchy ez-toc-counter ez-toc-grey ez-toc-container-direction\">\n<div class=\"ez-toc-title-container\">\n<p class=\"ez-toc-title \" >Table of Contents<\/p>\n<span class=\"ez-toc-title-toggle\"><a href=\"#\" class=\"ez-toc-pull-right ez-toc-btn ez-toc-btn-xs ez-toc-btn-default ez-toc-toggle\" aria-label=\"Toggle Table of Content\"><span class=\"ez-toc-js-icon-con\"><span class=\"\"><span class=\"eztoc-hide\" style=\"display:none;\">Toggle<\/span><span class=\"ez-toc-icon-toggle-span\"><svg style=\"fill: #999;color:#999\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" class=\"list-377408\" width=\"20px\" height=\"20px\" viewBox=\"0 0 24 24\" fill=\"none\"><path d=\"M6 6H4v2h2V6zm14 0H8v2h12V6zM4 11h2v2H4v-2zm16 0H8v2h12v-2zM4 16h2v2H4v-2zm16 0H8v2h12v-2z\" fill=\"currentColor\"><\/path><\/svg><svg style=\"fill: #999;color:#999\" class=\"arrow-unsorted-368013\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" width=\"10px\" height=\"10px\" viewBox=\"0 0 24 24\" version=\"1.2\" baseProfile=\"tiny\"><path d=\"M18.2 9.3l-6.2-6.3-6.2 6.3c-.2.2-.3.4-.3.7s.1.5.3.7c.2.2.4.3.7.3h11c.3 0 .5-.1.7-.3.2-.2.3-.5.3-.7s-.1-.5-.3-.7zM5.8 14.7l6.2 6.3 6.2-6.3c.2-.2.3-.5.3-.7s-.1-.5-.3-.7c-.2-.2-.4-.3-.7-.3h-11c-.3 0-.5.1-.7.3-.2.2-.3.5-.3.7s.1.5.3.7z\"\/><\/svg><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span><\/div>\n<nav><ul class='ez-toc-list ez-toc-list-level-1 ' ><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-1\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/proving-discrimination\/#Comparator\" title=\"Comparator\">Comparator<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-2\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/proving-discrimination\/#Burden_of_Proof\" title=\"Burden of Proof\">Burden of Proof<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-3\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/proving-discrimination\/#The_exception_reversal_of_the_burden_of_proof\" title=\"The exception: reversal of the burden of proof\">The exception: reversal of the burden of proof<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-4\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/proving-discrimination\/#Rebutting_Presumption\" title=\"Rebutting Presumption\">Rebutting Presumption<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-5\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/proving-discrimination\/#Statistics\" title=\"Statistics\">Statistics<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-6\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/proving-discrimination\/#Reversal_of_Burden\" title=\"Reversal of Burden\">Reversal of Burden<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-7\" href=\"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/proving-discrimination\/#Rounds_of_Discrimination\" title=\"Rounds of Discrimination\">Rounds of Discrimination<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/nav><\/div>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Comparator\"><\/span>Comparator<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>As in other equality contexts, the comparator should be in a similar or analogous situation.<\/p>\n<p>In Van der Mussele v Belgium the person claimed to be comparators were found to be in a different position and could not be used are not comparators legitimate comparators for the purpose of the claim.<\/p>\n<p>In Burden v UK sisters living together sought to compare their status with that civil partner. The European court did not accept that they were proper comparators because the relationship was different being founded on the decision to marry or enter a civil partnership.<\/p>\n<p>DH v Czech Republic confirmed that the guarantee encompasses indirect discrimination. This applies where the same requirements apply to both categories but significant numbers of persons in one category can meet the requirement relative to those in the other category.<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Burden_of_Proof\"><\/span>Burden of Proof<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>When examining the cases before it in terms of evidence, the Court usually applies the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio, that is to say, that the applicant has to prove his or her allegation.<\/p>\n<p>The Court applies the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d as a normal standard for all rights set forth by the Convention. In the proceedings before the Court, there are no procedural barriers to the admissibility of evidence or pre-determined formulae for its assessment. The Court adopts the conclusions that are, in its view, supported by the free evaluation of all evidence, including such inferences as may flow from the facts and the parties\u2019 submissions. According to its established case-law, proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact.<\/p>\n<p>Moreover, the level of persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion and, in this connection, the distribution of the burden of proof are intrinsically linked to the specificity of the facts, the nature of the allegation made and the Convention right at stake. The Court is also attentive to the seriousness that attaches to a ruling that a Contracting State has violated fundamental rights (Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2005, \u00a7 147; Timishev v. Russia, 2005, \u00a7 39; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, \u00a7 178; Muhammad v. Spain, 2022, \u00a7 94).<\/p>\n<p>In discrimination cases, the Court has established that, once the applicant has shown a difference in treatment, it is for the Government to show that it was justified (Timishev v. Russia, 2005, \u00a7 57).<\/p>\n<p>For example, in Timishev v. Russia, 2005, the applicant alleged that he was prevented from passing a checkpoint into a particular region because of his Chechen ethnic origin. The Court found this to be corroborated by official documents, which noted the existence of a policy to restrict the movement of ethnic Chechens. The State\u2019s explanation was found unconvincing because of inconsistencies in its assertion that the victim left voluntarily after being refused priority in the queue. Accordingly, the Court accepted that the applicant had been discriminated against on the basis of his ethnicity.<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"The_exception_reversal_of_the_burden_of_proof\"><\/span>The exception: reversal of the burden of proof<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>The Court has also recognised that Convention proceedings do not lend themselves in all cases to a rigorous application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio. For instance, where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, the burden of proof may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (Salman v. Turkey [GC], 2000, \u00a7 100; Anguelova v. Bulgaria, \u00a7 111; Makuchyan and Minasyan v. Azerbaijan and Hungary, 2020). The Court has also shifted the burden of proof in other cases where it would be extremely difficult in practice for the applicant to prove discrimination (C\u00een\u0163a v. Romania, 2020).<\/p>\n<p>In discrimination cases the Court has not excluded that in certain situations the respondent Government may be required to disprove an arguable allegation of discrimination and \u2013 if they fail to do so \u2013 the Court may find a violation of Article 14 of the Convention on that basis.<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Rebutting_Presumption\"><\/span>Rebutting Presumption<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>In order to rebut a presumption of discrimination, the State may either prove that the applicant is not actually in a similar or comparable situation to their \u201ccomparator\u201d, that the differential treatment is not based on the protected ground, but on other objective differences, or that the difference in treatment was justified (Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v. Russia [GC], 2017, \u00a7 65; Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], 1999, \u00a7\u00a7 91-92; Timishev v. Russia, 2005, \u00a7 57; Biao v. Denmark [GC], 2016, \u00a7 114; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, \u00a7 177).<\/p>\n<p>Such an approach has been mainly used in cases of alleged indirect discrimination, where the applicants may have difficulty in proving discriminatory treatment. In such cases statistical data can play an important role in helping the applicant to give rise to a presumption of discrimination. Where an applicant is able to show, on the basis of undisputed official statistics, the existence of a prima facie indication that a specific rule \u2013 although formulated in a neutral manner \u2013 in fact affects a clearly higher percentage of a group in comparison to another group, it is for the respondent Government to show that this is the result of objective factors unrelated to any discrimination (Hoogendijk v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2005; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2007, \u00a7 180; Di Trizio v. Switzerland, 2016, \u00a7 86).<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Statistics\"><\/span>Statistics<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>Statistics which appear on critical examination to be reliable and significant will be sufficient to constitute the prima facie evidence the applicant is required to produce. This does not, however, mean that indirect discrimination cannot be proved without statistical evidence (D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, \u00a7 188). Reliable national or international reports can also be used to that effect.<\/p>\n<p>A specific set of circumstances needs to be proven in domestic violence cases, where the applicant has to show that such violence affects mainly women and that the authorities\u2019 actions were not a simple failure or delay in dealing with domestic violence, but amounted to repeatedly condoning such violence and reflected a discriminatory attitude towards the applicant as a woman (Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, 2013, \u00a7 89). For example, in Talpis v. Italy, 2017, the Court considered that the applicant had demonstrated the existence of prima facie discrimination through the conclusions of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences and of the National Statistics Institute.<\/p>\n<p>In Opuz v. Turkey, 2009, there were no statistics presented to the Court showing that victims of domestic violence were predominantly women, and indeed it was noted that Amnesty International stated that there were no reliable data to this effect. Rather, the Court was prepared to accept the assessment of Amnesty International, a reputable international NGO and the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women that violence against women was a significant problem in Turkey.<\/p>\n<p>On the other hand, in Y and Others v. Bulgaria, 2022, the Court held that no concrete evidence had been presented to suggest that the domestic authorities had remained generally complacent in domestic violence cases. It was established that the Bulgarian authorities did not collect or keep comprehensive statistics about the manner in which the law-enforcement authorities handled domestic-violence cases, which was a serious omission already criticized by a number of international actors in the field. In the absence of comprehensive statistics, it was however open to the applicants to attempt to substantiate their assertion with other kinds of prima facie evidence, such as for instance specialised reports.<\/p>\n<p>However, the three international reports they submitted urged the Bulgarian authorities to combat any discrimination against women, but they did not in terms state that the police or other authorities were consistently downplaying or unwilling to deal with domestic violence cases, or cite concrete field data on the point. Not having, in addition, established any proof of anti-female bias by the State officials dealing specifically with the victim\u2019s case, or problems with the existing legal framework for the protection of women from domestic violence in Bulgaria, the Court found no violation of Article 14 in the case.<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Reversal_of_Burden\"><\/span>Reversal of Burden<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>In cases of alleged discrimination through violence, the Court has clarified that the alleged failure of the authorities to carry out an effective investigation into the supposedly discriminatory motive for a violent act should not, in itself, shift the burden of proof to the Government with regard to the alleged violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with the substantive aspect of Article 2 or Article 3 (ibid.). The contrary would amount to requiring the respondent Government to prove the absence of a particular subjective attitude on the part of the person concerned (Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2005, \u00a7 157; Bekos and Koutropoulos v. Greece, 2005, \u00a7 65).<\/p>\n<p>The case of Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2005, concerned the shooting of two Roma fugitives by military police during an attempted arrest. Ultimately, the Court concluded that it had not been established that racist attitudes played a role in the fugitives\u2019 deaths (see also Adam v. Slovakia, 2016). However,on the violation of Article 14 taken together with the procedural aspect of Article 2, the Court concluded that the authorities had failed in their duty to take all possible steps to investigate whether or not discrimination may have played a role in the events.<\/p>\n<p>In Makuchyan and Minasyan v. Azerbaijan and Hungary, 2020, in view of the special features of the case \u2013 the promotion of a sentenced murderer of an Armenian soldier, the award of several benefits without any legal basis, his glorification as a hero by a number of high-ranking Azerbaijani officials, as well as the creation of a special page on the website of the President \u2013 in the Court\u2019s view, the applicants had put forward sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences as to make a convincing prima facie case that the impugned measures had been motivated by the ethnic origin of the victims. Given the difficulty for the applicants to prove such bias beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court, in the particular circumstances of the case, reversed the burden of proof so that it became incumbent on Azerbaijan to disprove the arguable allegation of discrimination, which it had failed to do.<\/p>\n<p>In Basu v. Germany, 2022, the Court considered that, once there is an arguable claim that an individual may have been targeted by a police identity check on account of racial characteristics and such acts fall within the ambit of Article 8, the duty of the authorities to investigate the existence of a possible link between racist attitudes and the act of a State agent is to be considered as implicit in their responsibilities under Article 14 examined in conjunction with Article 8 (Muhammad v. Spain, 2022, 68, Basu v. Germany, 2022, \u00a7 35).<\/p>\n<p>The Court has also applied this rule in the context of alleged anti-union discrimination, finding that, once the applicants had demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of proof was to be shifted to the respondent, and the employer, usually having control over relevant evidence, had to demonstrate the existence of legitimate grounds for the applicants\u2019 dismissal (Hoppen and trade union of AB Amber Grid employees v. Lithuania*, 2023, \u00a7 230).<\/p>\n<p>In other discrimination cases, the practices or beliefs of others belonging to the same protected category may constitute sufficient proof. In Or\u0161u\u0161 and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010, concerning the placement of Roma children in Roma-only classes owing to their allegedly poor command of the Croatian language, the Court found that, unlike the case of D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, the statistics alone did not give rise to a presumption of discrimination. However, the fact that the measure of placing children in separate classes on the basis of their insufficient language skills had only applied to Roma students gave rise to a presumption of differential treatment.<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Rounds_of_Discrimination\"><\/span>Rounds of Discrimination<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>In Sidabras &amp; Dzautas v Lithuanian KGB officers had been dismissed from applying for jobs in the private sector. The restrictions which might have been justified on national security basis in the public sector could not be justified in the private sector. The court looked at the equality of treatment between persons who had been employed in the KGB and those who had not. The minority judges rejected this as a status as it was not an element of one\u2019s personality in the same way as other protected statuses.<\/p>\n<p>In DH v Czech Republic, the state had sought to improve the education of children of Roma origin. There were special schools of persons with learning difficulties who had difficulty with the ordinary curriculum. Qualification for the school was based on tests and assessments by the principal teacher.<\/p>\n<p>Statistically, a majority of pupils in the schools were of Roma origin and were many times more likely to be in a special school than an ordinary school. The court considered that the tests were culturally biased notwithstanding that there was no positive intention. It found indirect discrimination in that the measures although positively intended at some level, ended up impacting on members of the Roma community to a far greater extent than others. The discrimination was indirect and not intended as such.<\/p>\n<p>According to the established case law, proof may follow from the coexistence of a sufficiently strong clear and concordant inferences are similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Moreover, the level of persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion and in this connection the distribution of the burden of proof are intrinsically linked to the specificity of the fact the nature of the allegation made and the Convention right at stake.<\/p>\n<p>The court considers that when it comes to assessing the impact of the measure or practice on an individual or a group statistic which appear on critical examination to be reliable and significant will be sufficient to constitute the primary phase of the evidence of the applicant that the applicant is required to produce. That does not however mean that indirect discrimination cannot be proved without statistics.<\/p>\n<!--themify_builder_content-->\n<div id=\"themify_builder_content-23380\" data-postid=\"23380\" class=\"themify_builder_content themify_builder_content-23380 themify_builder tf_clear\">\n    <\/div>\n<!--\/themify_builder_content-->\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Comparator As in other equality contexts, the comparator should be in a similar or analogous situation. In Van der Mussele v Belgium the person claimed to be comparators were found to be in a different position and could not be used are not comparators legitimate comparators for the purpose of the claim. In Burden v [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_exactmetrics_skip_tracking":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_active":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_note":"","_exactmetrics_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[348],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23380"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=23380"}],"version-history":[{"count":19,"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23380\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":23516,"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23380\/revisions\/23516"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=23380"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=23380"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=23380"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}