<\/span><\/h3>\nAfter establishing a legitimate aim, the Court requires that the difference in treatment strike a fair balance between the protection of the interests of the community and respect for the rights and freedoms of the individual (the Belgian linguistic case, 1968, \u00a7 10 of \u201cthe Law\u201d part). Thus, the Court requires a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised (Molla Sali v. Greece [GC], 2018, \u00a7 135; Fabris v. France [GC], 2013, \u00a7 56; Mazurek v. France, 2000, \u00a7\u00a7 46 and 48; Larkos v. Cyprus [GC], 1999, \u00a7 29).<\/p>\n
As the Court\u2019s role is not to substitute the competent national authorities in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justified differential treatment, States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation. The scope of that margin will vary according to the circumstances, the subject-matter and the background of the case (Molla Sali v. Greece [GC], 2018,
\n\u00a7 136; Stummer v. Austria [GC], 2011, \u00a7 88; Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, \u00a7 60; Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2010, \u00a7 61).<\/p>\n
On the one hand, the Court has indicated some areas where the State\u2019s margin of appreciation remains rather wide. For example, the Court has held that, because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is in the public interest on social or economic grounds, and the Court will generally respect the legislature\u2019s policy choice unless it is manifestly without reasonable foundation (Belli and Arquier-Martinez v. Switzerland, 2018, \u00a7 94; Mamatas and Others v. Greece, 2016, \u00a7\u00a7 88-89; Stummer v. Austria [GC], 2011, \u00a7 89; Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], 2009, \u00a7 83; Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, \u00a7 60; Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2006, \u00a7 52; Carson and Others
\nv. the United Kingdom [GC], 2010, \u00a7 61). The same is true for matters related to general measures of social strategy (the Belgian linguistic case, 1968, \u00a7 10 of \u201cthe Law\u201d part) and property (Chabauty v. France [GC], 2012, \u00a7 50).<\/p>\n
On the other hand, the Court has also identified certain grounds of discrimination where such margin is reduced. Indeed the Court has held time and again that no difference in treatment based exclusively or to a decisive extent on a person\u2019s ethnic origin was capable of being objectively justified in a modern democratic society built on the principles of pluralism and respect for different cultures (D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, \u00a7 176; Sejdi\u0107 and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], 2009, \u00a7\u00a7 43-44). Similarly, differences in treatment on the basis of gender or sexual orientation may only be justified by very weighty reasons (Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 1985, \u00a7 78; Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], 2012, \u00a7 127; Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2020,
\n\u00a7 96; Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010, \u00a7 97).<\/p>\n
As with the other provisions of the Convention, one of the criteria used by the Court to define the State\u2019s margin of appreciation in discrimination cases is the existence and the extent of a consensus among Contracting States on the issue at stake. Since the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection of human rights, the Court must have regard to the changing conditions in Contracting States and respond to any emerging consensus as to the standards to be achieved (Weller v. Hungary, 2009, \u00a7 28; Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2006, \u00a7\u00a7 63-64; \u00dcnal Tekeli \u00a0v. Turkey, 2004, \u00a7 54; Stafford v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2002, \u00a7 68; Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], 2012, \u00a7 126).<\/p>\n\n
\n <\/div>\n\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Objective and Reasonable justification Burden v UK\u00a0 A difference in treatment is discriminatory if it does not have an objective and reasonable justification; in other words, if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if it there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aims which are to […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_exactmetrics_skip_tracking":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_active":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_note":"","_exactmetrics_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[348],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23384"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=23384"}],"version-history":[{"count":14,"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23384\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":23589,"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23384\/revisions\/23589"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=23384"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=23384"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/legalblog.ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=23384"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}