Domicile
General
Domicile is important in relation to matters of personal status such as marriage, property transfer, succession and some contexts, long-term taxation.
A person’s domicile of origin applies at birth. At common law, a legitimate child born during the lifetime of the father was deemed to have the domicile of the father at his or her date of birth. An illegitimate (nonmarital) child was deemed to have the domicile of his or her mother at the time of birth.
A person must intend to and actually reside in a country of choice. The intention must be to live for an unlimited time. The domicile of origin persists until it is shown to be abandoned and another is required. The onus of proof of a change of domicile is on the person alleging it.
A person may acquire a domicile of choice by residing in another jurisdiction, other than that of origin with the intention to continue to do so permanently or indefinitely. In principle, a person may choose to change domicile so often as he wishes.
A domicile of dependency applies to persons who lack capacity. It applies to minors as seen above and persons lacking mental capacity. At common law it applied also to a spouse  before being abolished in 1986.
Jurisdiction
Domicile refers to a jurisdiction. In the case of a federal system, domicile refers to the constituent element of the state concerned.
Where the identity of state changes difficult questions may arise as to domicile. Border shifted considerably in the wake of the First World War and in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union. Ireland became independent from the United Kingdom, over a period from 1922 to 1938.
Where a person is domiciled in the part of a state which later changes jurisdiction, the presumption appears to be that they have domicile in the successor part of that in which they were born.
In federal systems, there are by definition different legal systems applicable in state’s sub federal units. In principle a person has a domicile in the federal or sub-state unit for the purposes of federal and state law.
The Law Reform Commission recommended legislation to provide that where a person had habitual residence and intends to live in a definitely in a state with sub- territorial units with different systems of law but is not his or her intention to live indefinitely in any specific one, he should be deemed to live indefinitely in the one which is his habitual residence, or if no habitual residence, in the one which he normally resides or otherwise in the one in which she has last ordinarily resided.
Principles of Domicile
Domicile is interpreted in accordance with Irish law. The principles of domicile in Ireland and the UK are almost identical.
In principle a person must have a single domicile at any time. In theory it should remain constant regardless of the issue under consideration.
There is some support for the principle that there may be different domiciles for different purposes, but this approach appears undesirable and may lead to anomalies. Where a transaction is legal in one possible state of domicile and not in another, this may be a factor in determining domicile on the basis that parties are presumed to act lawfully
Acquiring a Domicile of Choice
Acquiring a domicile of choice in a jurisdiction, requires the intention to reside there permanently or indefinitely. The classic position is where a long-term emigrant leaves to set up his or her life in another state.
Residence implies more than a casual presence. It is not the same as the taxation concept in this context. Residence can, in principle, be established immediately when a person arrives with the intention to settle. On the other hand, an intention to reside may not be sufficient if one lacks sufficient presence.
Where a person’s residence in the country is illegal many courts hold that a domicile of choice may not be acquired. However other courts have taken a different view.
The key concept is the intention to reside in the jurisdiction indefinitely. It’s not clear whether it should be an intention to reside in the state indefinitely or until date of death. Sometimes the concepts of indefinite residence and the intention to end one’s et cetera are used interchangeably.
Indicators of Domicile
Domicile is an inference of law based on the facts in the circumstances. The test is objective. Subjective intention is not necessarily a factor.
Setting up a business or undertaking employment may or may not be evidence of a domicile of choice. It depends on the circumstances.
In some cases, establishing a business may be evidence of an intention to stay and make the place his or her home long-term and not return to the native country. In other cases, a person may still retain an intention to live in another country or revert to their domicile of origin.
Taking up permanent and pensionable employment, purchasing a property, marrying,  settling down and having children may be strong factors pointing to a  domicile of choice. However they are not necessarily decisive.
In the context of the European Union, persons may move from state to state setting up  employment and life in different states. Many Irish people have strong connections to  Britain. In this context, a person may retain his or her domicile notwithstanding living long-term in another state.
It may not be capable in the circumstances of displacing the presumption of domicile that domicile of origin is retained.
Domicile and Compulsion
There have been different opinions when persons have claimed change of domicile arising out of necessity or by compulsion. Historically changing one’s domicile by reason of medical necessity was not readily allowed. Travelling in modern times, often to settle in sunnier climates is more common for lifestyle and long-term health reasons. The more modern position place less emphasis on motivation. The general principles apply.
A prisoner is regarded as retaining domicile during the period of imprisonment. His intent is not operative. It was assumed that members of the Armed Forces could not acquire a domicile of choice during service. This approach has been reversed. In principle, a soldier may intend to stay in a particular country after service, and ordinary principles apply.
A diplomat may be posted in a particular jurisdiction but may have little input into the decision. He or she will not generally be taken to have acquired a domicile of choice merely because of his or her presence as a diplomat.
Declarations
Evidence of domicile is usually by way of inference. Asking a person who may be a party to the case is usually weak evidence because the person may have an interest in the outcome at that stage. However, evidence of earlier declarations before the issue arose may be helpful, though not necessarily determinative. It will depend on the particular circumstances. Statements must be backed up by conduct consistent with the declaration.
The context of the declaration will be important. Where it is made before the matter in dispute arises and is consistent with acts and behaviour it carries greater weight. A person’s conduct must be consistent with the declaration of intent. In some contexts, the failure to make a declaration may be relevant.
An advanced declaration of domicile made on legal advice may carry less weight than one may spontaneously. Declarations indicating an intention to return on an event which is contingent, which is not contemplated by the individual, which is uncertain, limited or undefined, may be given little or no weight.
Declarations of intent might possibly be evidence of intent to resume domicile if the person does, in fact, return. They may not be sufficient to outweigh the natural result of his actions where the person did not, in fact, return. It depends on the circumstances
Declarations of a person referring specifically to a person’s domicile may be of limited value where the person does not have an understanding of the concept concerned. A person may more readily assert his nationality which is not necessarily the same as domicile. People may feel strongly on political issues as to their identity but this may not necessarily coincide with their domicile.
An intention to return home may in context be evidence of domicile. However, it may merely refer to residence. However in some contexts it may be proof of a long-term intent to return to another country.
If a person makes statements that he wishes to die in a certain country, this may be evidence in relation to domicile. Instructions to be buried in a particular place contemplated may or may not be weighty. A person may contemplate continuing to reside in one state but being buried in another state. The fact that a will is open on death may be relevant in this context.
Abandoning Domicile of Choice
The domicile of choice can be abandoned by ceasing to reside in the jurisdiction concerned with the intention of no longer intending to live there. The onus is on the person concerned to prove this. It appears that evidence to establish abandonment of the domicile of choice need not be as strong as that for abandonment of the domicile of origin or the acquisition of a new one.
A domicile of choice may be abandoned without evidence of acquiring a new domicile. In this case it appears that the domicile of origin revives.
It appears that the domicile of origin is easier to lose than the domicile of choice. There is a rebuttable presumption in favour of continuance of the domicile of origin. Abandonment is not to be inferred from an attitude of indifference or disinclination to move with increasing years. It is said that there must be a fixed and settled purpose to abandon a domicile of origin.
It appears that abandonment of residence is not alone. The domicile of origin persistently is proved to have been intentionally and voluntarily abandoned and supplanted by another.
Domicile of Minors
The domicile of a child under the age of majority (18 ) is the domicile of the parent upon whom he or she is dependent. This was invariably the father at common law. The domicile of a legitimate child after the death of his or her father is determined by the domicile of his mother.
A minor may, on obtaining the age of majority, acquire a domicile of choice different to his or her domicile of origin.
It is assumed that upon adoption, a child takes the domicile of the adoptive father. However, under common law, the domicile of a legitimate child changed automatically with the domicile of the father. Different views are taken as to whether the same principle applies to a non-legitimate child and his or her mother.
Modern cases hold that where parents live separate and apart the child retains the domicile of the party in whose custody he or she is. It was indicated that the father’s domicile is based in part on responsibility for the child. If its father had walked out on the child and left his life, it would not have continued.
Domicile of Dependence Pre-1986
Prior to 1986 the common law principle of domicile of dependence applied to married women. The legislation abolishing the common law principle was seen as long overdue.
After the legislation, the domicile of a married woman is to be independent. Domicile is determined by reference the same factors as in the case of any other person capable of having an independent domicile. The rule of law or by a married woman acquired domicile of a husband and marriage was abolished. The 1986 provision applied to the parties to every marriage, irrespective of where the marriage takes place.
In 1989 the High Court held that the common law domicile of dependence of a spouse did not survive the enactment of the Constitution. The Supreme Court upheld the case in 1993. The effect, therefore, was that retrospectively, the rules on domicile were changed. The 1986 Act applied only after its enactment
In 2015 the Supreme Court unusually, decided that the earlier case was wrong. McG. v. W. sought to modify the common law rule in relation to recognition of foreign divorces in respect of the period prior to the Act of 1986.
The basis upon which a common law rule can be modified was identified in the decision of this Court in W. v. W., in which it was recognised that common law rules are judge-made law and may be modified, if necessary, having regard to public policy. In that case, the common law rule in relation to the dependent domicile of wives was modified to bring it into line with the statutory rule provided for in the Act of 1986. It is undoubtedly the case that the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996 enables divorces to be granted by reason of residence in the State but if the legislature had wished to modify the position in relation to the recognition of foreign divorces, it was open to the legislature to do so at that time or indeed at any subsequent time. No such change has been brought about and in circumstances where the 1986 Act governs the recognition of foreign divorces on the basis of domicile, I fail to see how it could be said that the present policy of the court is such that the common law rule applicable to foreign divorces granted prior to the 2nd October 1986 may be modified. For that reason I regret to say that in my view, McG. v. W was not correctly decided.