Equitable & Rights Bar
Constitutional and Human Rights
Generally, the courts have rejected challenges to limitation periods on Human Rights and constitutional grounds. The Supreme Courts have tended to hold that the statutory limitations reflect a fair balancing of the constitutional right of access to the courts and the interests in finality and in quieting disputes and titles.
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court struck down a provision of the Statute of Limitation by which an extension of time on the grounds of disability was not available to an underage child in the custody of a parent or guardian while being available to an underage child not in such custody. In the same era, the special short two-year post-death time limit in respect of claims against the estate of a deceased estate was upheld by a similarly constituted Supreme Court.
The absence of a discoverability test in cases of negligence other than personal injuries was found constitutional, notwithstanding that a right of action may run and be barred in circumstances unknown and unknowable to him and notwithstanding that it deprived the claimant of his constitutionally protected right of recourse to the court.
In a Human Rights Convention challenge to the UK’s 12-year Statute of Limitation period, the lower level court held that there was a deprivation of the claimant’s rights. England and Wales reformed its laws on adverse possession in response. However, the full European Court of Human Rights held that the legislation was legitimate, notwithstanding that it involved the deprivation of title to land without compensation.
Delay in Equity I
The Statute of Limitations does not apply to claims for equitable relief. A court may deny equitable relief, notwithstanding that the limitations period has not expired. Where a claimant has not acted with due diligence in the commencement and prosecution a claim, equitable relief may be denied. This is the principle of laches or acquiescence. It derives from the discretionary basis of equitable relief.
The principle of laches in equity is more flexible in its operation than the Statute of Limitations period. The criteria are case specific. Where it would be unjust to grant the remedy, because of delay or neglect on the claimant’s part, equitable relief is likely to be denied. The courts will look at the totality of circumstances will consider whether the balance of justice requires that the remedy be withheld.
In considering the question of delay, the courts will have regard to any change of position on the part of the defendant resulting from the delay. The principle is similar to that of estoppel, in some respects. Where an equitable remedy (such as an injunction) is refused, a common law remedy (such as damages) may be granted, where the claim is commenced within the limitations period.
Delay in Equity II
The entirety of the circumstances will be considered as to whether the delay is unreasonable. If for example, the defendant is exercising undue influence over the claimant, the delay will not be a factor during this time. The fact of delay by itself is not sufficient to bar an equitable remedy. Generally, it must be such as to prejudice or adversely affect the defendant.
Laches/delay will not usually operate against a beneficiary of a trust or a fiduciary duty. However, in a commercial context, where the fiduciary duties arise by operation of law between parties who deal at arm’s length, the principle of laches /delay may apply, in particular where the delay is prolonged.
In the case of an injunction, a very short delay may be sufficient to lead to refusal of relief. The remedies are not generally available where the claimant has not acted promptly. The claimant’s argument that he would be critically prejudiced by the failure to grant the remedy, carries less weight where he has delayed in seeking the relief.
Similarly, it is well established that an application for specific performance must be bought reasonably promptly. A delay of a number of months may be sufficient to deny relief in some circumstances. In other circumstances, the justice of the case may be such that a longer delay may not bar the grant of specific performance.
Dismissal for Delay
There is a general jurisdiction to dismiss proceedings for want of prosecution. It may be exercised where there has been substantial prejudice, such as to cause fundamental unfairness to the defendant. Where there is a clear and patent unfairness in asking the defendant to meet the case after a long lapse of time, to which the defendant has not contributed and to which the claimant may have contributed, the court may exercise its jurisdiction to dismiss the action.
These criteria may arise in cases where the normal Statute of Limitations period is postponed due to the discoverability rule in personal injury cases.
The lapse of time may lead to a real and serious risk of an unfair trial in many cases. Witnesses may be may be able to recollect the position. They may be dead or otherwise unavailable. The absence of a witness or their inability to recall the facts may prejudice the defendant to such an extent, that proceedings will not be allowed.
The possibility of claims being brought after a long delay arises in the case of a minor. The main Statute of Limitations period extends or a period of three years after the child reaches the age of majority. However, the courts may restrain the taking of a claim after a very substantial delay on the basis that the defendant cannot have the benefit of a fair trial.
Want of Prosecution
Courts have an inherent jurisdiction to dismiss proceedings for want of prosecution. The jurisdiction is confirmed by and provided in the rules of court. The criteria are generally that the delay is inordinate and inexcusable.
The courts will consider the issue of the prejudice to the defendant. It will consider the relative importance of the case to which the claimant and the relative strength of the parties. An important factor against dismissal is that the defendant has induced or caused the delay.
Sexual Abuse Cases
The question of discoverability under the Statute of Limitations Act Amendment Act 1991 was an issue in some of the earlier cases arising from the sexual abuse of minors. Â The courts in a number of cases were prepared to take a sympathetic view to claimants and to accept that they were not aware of the significance of certain psychiatric and psychological injuries attributable to the sexual assault and delay in the receipt of the help of experts and advice.
The Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act 2000 extended the limitation period in relation to sexual abuse cases. Where a claimant had been sexually abused when he or she was a minor but had ceased to be under a disability for a period in excess of the Statute of Limitations the claimant had one additional year after the passing of the Act in which to initiate proceedings.
The claimant must either have obtained legal advice, which caused him to believe that an action could not be brought or must have complained to Garda SÃochána about the abuse prior to that date. For the purpose of bringing an action in relation to sex abuse where the person was a minor, a person was deemed under a disability while he is suffering from a psychological injury that was caused in whole or in part by that act or other act of the person who committed that act which was of such significance that his will or his ability to make a reasoned decision to bring action was substantially impaired.
The Act confirms the general power of the courts to dismiss an action on the basis of long delay where the interests of justice warrant dismissal. The claim of unfair prejudice has been made in civil claims based on historical abuse, often many decades before.  Where the delay has been inexcusable and inordinate such as very many decades, the court may exercise its discretion, to dismiss the claim on account of the prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial of the matter.
In cases of deliberate and serious abuse, the courts have not been generally regarded that the taking of proceedings after a prolonged delay, as fundamentally unfair in itself.